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One of the most striking developments in American criminal law and 
procedure in the past four decades has been the widespread establishment of 
victims’ rights at both the federal and state levels.  For supporters of victims’ 
rights, the story is one of almost universal success.  Every state now has a 
statutory or constitutional provision requiring that many victims of crime 
receive notice of and the right to participate in any criminal proceedings 
against the alleged perpetrators in some fashion.1  This is a tectonic shift 
compared with previous attitudes toward victim participation given the long-
standing emphasis on prosecutors alone controlling the state’s proceedings 
against an accused.  Victims’ rights came to be recognized by the federal 
government as well, with the passage of federal statutes providing for victim 
participation in federal court proceedings.2  The U.S. Department of Justice 
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Organizational Leadership; Ph.D. candidate, College of Education, Criminal Justice, and Human 
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 1. See Steven J. Twist & Daniel Seiden, The Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment: A 
Brief Point/Counterpoint, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 341, 344 (2012). 
 2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2012). 
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and all fifty states now have some form of victims’ rights legislation, and many 
private organizations actively support the movement as well.3 
A conspicuous exception to the success of the victims’ rights movement has 
been the failure of Congress to pass a proposed amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution that would uniformly establish such rights in all federal and state 
courts.  This has not been a fringe effort.  Advanced by both private 
organizations and state officials, and with bipartisan support in Congress, bills 
establishing a Victims’ Rights Amendment (VRA) have been introduced 
several times in the past three decades and twice passed the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.4  Several proposals for a VRA have been introduced in recent 
years.5  Despite the apparent strong support among members of Congress and 
the public, the bills have not progressed further; however, it seems likely that 
there will be additional future efforts to pass similar bills.6 
Adoption of the VRA, or any federal legislation mandating recognition of 
victims’ rights at both the federal and state levels, of course raises federalism 
concerns.7  The now considerable scholarly literature on the proposed VRA is 
not oblivious to federalism issues, but has not fully engaged them, either.8  
Supporters of the VRA have not convincingly argued that an addition to the 
Bill of Rights is necessary given the widespread recognition of victims’ rights 
at the state level.9  Conversely, critics of the VRA have argued that 
nationalizing victims’ rights is inappropriate, even though they support the 
imposition of federal standards in many other aspects of state criminal 
proceedings.10  This Article undertakes a fresh and critical examination of the 
                                                 
 3. For overviews of these developments, see Paul G. Cassell, The Victims’ Rights 
Amendment: A Sympathetic, Clause-by-Clause Analysis, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 301, 303‒04 (2012); 
see also infra Part I.  See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, 
VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2010). 
 4. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 5. See H.R.J. Res. 106, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 40, 113th Cong. (2013); H.J. Res. 
45, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 6. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 304‒05; infra Part II.A. 
 7. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 316‒17 (discussing the VRA and federalism).  Short of a 
constitutional amendment, Congress could pass legislation that accomplishes essentially the same 
result, for instance by conditioning state receipt of federal funds on the adoption of certain 
minimum protections for crime victims.  Congress has taken such a path with community 
notification laws for sex offenders and other measures that aid victims in various ways.  See 
Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 51, 52 (2008).  Another recent example of such federal intervention is the Obama 
Administration’s initiative to improve steps colleges take to protect students from sexual assault.  
See NOT ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS 
FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 2‒4 (April 2014), https://www.notalone.gov/assets/report.pdf; see also 
Richard Pérez-Peña & Kate Taylor, Fight Against Sex Assaults Holds Colleges to Account, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2014, at A1. 
 8. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 3, at 301‒02. 
 9. Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to 
Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 157, 170 (1992). 
 10. See Twist & Seiden, supra note 1, at 360. 
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federalism implications of the VRA, and of the arguments by both its 
supporters and critics.  Furthermore, this Article concludes that application of 
the functional arguments in favor of federalism, such as promoting state 
experimentation and permitting state law to govern in the absence of interstate 
externalities, suggests that the VRA should not be passed.  More generally, this 
Article sets out criteria that will guide policymakers in deciding when, if ever, 
to require all states to follow a uniform victims’ rights regime, by way of the 
VRA or some other means. 
By the same token, this Article does not argue that the federal government 
does not have a role to play in the application or development of victims’ 
rights under state law.  One solution allows federal courts to account for 
certain aspects of victims’ rights when considering petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus by state prisoners.  To date, most federal courts have not been presented 
with this novel issue, but the courts that have encountered it have held that 
victims of state-prosecuted crimes have limited or no rights to participate in 
federal habeas proceedings.11  This Article argues that, properly interpreted, 
federal statutes indeed permit interested victims to meaningfully participate in 
federal habeas proceedings, and it should be encouraged. 
Part I of this Article begins by outlining the ascension of the victims’ rights 
movement and its embodiment in state constitutional and statutory provisions.  
Part I then considers how states have implemented these provisions.  Part II 
addresses the proposed VRA from a federalism perspective.  It first outlines 
the history of congressional efforts to pass the VRA, and then considers and 
critically evaluates the federalism arguments made by both supporters and 
opponents of the VRA.  Part III examines whether passage of the VRA would 
empower federal courts to enforce its provisions through injunctive actions, 
and whether, and to what extent, federal courts would be likely to do so.  Part 
III also discusses whether, and to what extent, federal courts in habeas corpus 
actions should enforce victims’ rights when reviewing the legality of 
convictions resulting from state prosecutions. 
I.  VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN THE STATES 
A.  The Victims’ Rights Movement and Variability of Victims’ Rights Among 
the States 
Since the 1960s there has been support for victims’ rights in criminal 
proceedings at both the state and federal levels.  The victims’ rights movement 
sought the enactment of legislation and public policy changes in order to offer 
victims ways to participate in and be heard during the criminal justice process 
concerning their victimization.12  The movement also sought to provide 
protection, compensation, and services for victims of crime as well as affected 
                                                 
 11. See, e.g., Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 136 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 12. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 303‒07. 
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family members.13  While it is widely assumed that the victims’ rights 
movement began in the early 1970s, by then states had already begun to 
advance policies and programs aimed at victim advocacy.14  For example, in 
1965, California began to provide compensation to qualifying victims in order 
to lessen the financial impact of crime.15  These policies may have grown out 
of President Lyndon Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice.16  The President’s Commission was designed to 
“assess the extent of the crime problem” in response to the growing crime rate 
in the United States.17  The Commission found that a significant proportion of 
victims did not report crimes, thus resulting in the creation of the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which was established to 
help “fund and advise programs” involved in the prevention of victimization.18  
The LEAA hoped that crime-reporting rates would increase in response to its 
support of prevention and intervention efforts for victims of crime.19 
Victims’ rights advocates were especially active at the state level in the 
following decades.  The emergence of the victims’ rights movement at the state 
level was facilitated by Congress passing the Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) in 
1984, which “provided funds for victim assistance programs, victim 
compensation, and discretionary funding for research on victim needs.”20  In 
1986, victims’ rights advocates formed the National Victims’ Constitutional 
Amendment Network (NVCAN) to lobby for a federal constitutional 
amendment, though it initially devoted its efforts—quite successfully—in 
support of state constitutional or statutory provisions codifying victims’ 
rights.21  Following the passage of the VOCA and California’s example, and 
due to the efforts of the NVCAN, states began to expand their own 
compensatory programs and protections for victims in their respective 
constitutions and statutory provisions.22 
One of the most notable accomplishments of the victims’ rights movement 
was giving victims the right to be heard.  Prior to the 1970s, victims did not 
participate in the criminal process unless they were asked or required to 
                                                 
 13. See Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims’ Rights: From Illusion to Reality, 
24 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5‒6 (2009). 
 14. See Jeanne M. Mastrocinque, An Overview of the Victims’ Rights Movement: Historical, 
Legislative, and Research Developments, 4 SOC. COMPASS 95, 95 (2010). 
 15. Id. at 96. 
 16. Id. at 95‒96. 
 17. Id. at 96. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Victims and Victimization: Rights of Victims, NAT’L INST. JUST. (2008), http://www. 
nij.gov/topics/victims-victimization/rights.htm; see infra Part II. 
 21. Victoria Schwartz, Recent Development, The Victims’ Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 525, 525‒30 (2005). 
 22. Mastrocinque, supra note 14, at 97‒98. 
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testify.23  Again, California led the way for victims’ rights by requesting the 
first victim impact statement in 1976.24  Generally, a victim impact statement 
is a written or oral statement provided by a crime victim, or the victim’s 
family, that provides information about the physical, psychological, emotional, 
and financial harm that the crime had on the victim.25  A victim impact 
statement is typically presented during pre-sentencing and parole hearings.26  
By 1992, at least thirteen states allowed victim impact evidence to be 
submitted at capital sentencing hearings.27  Currently, all states allow victim 
impact statements during some phase of the sentencing process and at parole 
hearings.28 
By 2003, all fifty states had victims’ compensation programs and some form 
of victims’ rights legislation.29  To date, thirty-three states have constitutional 
provisions protecting victims’ rights.30  Moreover, all states have statutory 
provisions that protect victims’ rights.31  Most states’ provisions offer victims 
                                                 
 23. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 303. 
 24. ELLEN K. ALEXANDER & JANICE HARRIS LORD, IMPACT STATEMENTS: A VICTIM’S 
RIGHT TO SPEAK, A NATION’S RESPONSIBILITY TO LISTEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1994), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/reports/impact/welcome.html. 
 25. Victim Impact Statements, Nat’l Ctr. for Victims of Crime (2008), http://www. 
victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get.help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/victim-impact-stat 
ements. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Michael Ira Oberlander, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital 
Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1647 (1992). 
 28. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 25. 
 29. Victims and Victimization: Rights of Victims, supra note 20. 
 30. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; COLO. CONST. art. II, §16a; CONN. CONST. art. XXIX, § b; FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 16; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13b; KAN. 
CONST. art. 15, § 15; LA. CONST. art. I, § 25; MD. CONST. art. IV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; 
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 32; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28; NEB. CONST. 
art. I, § 28; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 37; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. CONST. art. I, § 
42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35; TEX. CONST. art. 
I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8a; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35; WIS. 
CONST. art. I, § 9m.  For a comprehensive breakdown of victims’ compensation by state, see 
Summary of State Requirements and Maximum Benefits, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIME VICTIM 
COMPENSATION BDS. (2013), http://www.nacvcb.org/ [hereinafter NACVCB]; see Appendix. 
 31. ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-1, 41-84 (2014); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2014); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4401‒4439 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-1101‒1115 (2014); CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 679‒680 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-100.1‒304 (2015); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9401‒9419 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 960.001‒.298 (West 2014); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2015); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 120/1-9 (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-40-5-1 to 35-40-13-5 (West 2014); IOWA 
CODE §§ 915.10‒.100 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7301‒7321 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 421.500‒.576 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1841‒1845 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 15, § 6101 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1171‒1177 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 258B, §§ 1-3, 5-13 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.751‒.911 (West 2014); 
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the following rights: to be present at criminal proceedings, to information and 
notification, to protection, to due process, to compensation, to be heard, and to 
a timely disposition of the case.32  All of this information is compiled in the 
Appendix. 
While virtually every state provides all of these rights via constitutional or 
statutory provisions, the zeal with which they are enforced, or the lack thereof, 
differs based on numerous factors, such as jurisdiction, judicial discretion, and 
budgetary limitations.33  The inconsistency of enforcement among the states is 
used as a primary argument in favor of enacting a VRA.34  While most states 
provide in their constitutions or statutes that victims have the right to the 
provisions discussed above, programs vary considerably across states.  Some 
of these differences are grounded in basic definitions of who is a “victim,”35 or 
how to determine what length of time satisfies the “speedy” trial guarantee.36 
Other interstate differences depend on the scope of the right accorded the 
victim.  One example is the victim compensation filing times and maximum 
payouts per state, found in the Appendix.  For instance, Alabama and Ohio 
differ considerably in their filing time and maximum compensation for 
                                                 
 
MINN. STAT. § 611A (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-43-1‒49 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
595.010‒.218 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-101‒133 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-
1848 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.015 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k 
(2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:12-14 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-26-4‒10 (West 2014); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.42 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 142A–B (2014); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 147.405‒.421 (2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.201 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 12-28-1‒13 (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-22-90 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 
23A‒28C-16 (2015); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. §§ 56.01‒64 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-38-1-7 (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-37-1‒5 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§§ 5301‒5322 (2015); WIS. STAT. §§ 950.01‒.11 (2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-21-102‒103 
(2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-6-501‒509 (2015).  See also Schwartz, supra note 21, at 
527‒28. 
 32. See supra notes 30‒31 and accompanying text. 
 33. Cassell, supra note 3, at 303‒09; Schwartz, supra note 21, at 546‒48. 
 34. Cassell, supra note 3, at 303; infra Part II.  It is unclear whether any systematic factors 
account for the variance of victims’ right among the states.  Studies of interstate policy diffusion 
for criminal justice examine, among other variables, the geographic proximity, political ideology, 
crime rates, and public opinion of different jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Tiffany Bergin, How and Why 
Do Criminal Justice Public Policies Spread Throughout U.S. States? A Critical Review of the 
Diffusion Literature, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 403, 405 (2011); Todd Makse & Craig Volden, 
The Role of Policy Attributes in the Diffusion of Innovations, 73 J. POL. 108, 108 (2011).  
However, these studies do not show a correlation between these variables and the rapidity or 
scope of the adoption of victims’ rights.  E.g., Scott P. Hays, Influences on Reinvention During 
the Diffusion of Innovations, 49 POL. RES. Q. 631, 642 (1996) (studying diffusion of victims’ 
compensation laws). 
 35. Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim 
Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 153‒55 (1999). 
 36. Mary Beth Ricke, Note, Victims’ Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, Improvements, 
and Alternatives to Legislative Protection, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 181, 184‒86 (2013). 
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victims.37  Alabama has a one-year filing limit for victims’ compensation; 
meaning that the victim has one year from the date the crime is reported to file 
for compensation from the state.38  The maximum amount that a victim can 
receive from Alabama is $15,000.39  In contrast, Ohio has no time limit on 
when a victim may file for compensation, and there is a maximum $50,000 
payout.40 
The Justice Fellowship recently commissioned a report showing the amount 
of compensation paid out to victims by states through their compensation 
programs.41  The report examined the average amount each state’s victim 
compensation fund directly paid to victims of violent crime in 2012.42  Rates 
ranged from close to $1,300 to $25.  In 2012, there were nearly seven million 
victims of violent crime aged twelve and older.43  Meanwhile, victim 
compensation funds assist approximately 200,000 victims of crime annually 
and award nearly $500 million to them.44  Thus, only a fraction of victims are 
receiving the funds they are entitled to, with varying levels of compensation 
among the states.45 
B.  Victim Impact Statements 
One of the most notable changes in the criminal justice process, largely due 
to the victims’ rights movement, was the inclusion of victim impact statements 
during both trials and parole hearings.46  A victim impact statement gives the 
victim a voice during the criminal justice process, and all states recognize the 
right of victims to be heard.47  While all states allow victim impact statements 
to be presented and considered some time before the sentencing process, when, 
where, and how they are delivered varies considerably depending on the 
jurisdiction and judge.48  Most states allow the victim to present either an oral 
or written statement for a designated parole officer to include in the offender’s 
pre-sentencing report, which is then considered by the judge.49  Other times, 
                                                 
 37. ALA. CODE § 15-23-15(a)‒(b) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.42 (West 2011). 
 38. ALA. CODE § 15-23-12(a)(1) (2014). 
 39. Id. § 15-23-12(b). 
 40. See Appendix; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.42. 
 41. DOUGLAS N. EVANS, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME 1 (2014). 
 42. Id. at 6. 
 43. Id. at 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  Improvements that could and should be made to benefit victims of crime beyond the 
scope of this article.  For proposals that could improve victims’ awareness concerning the 
programs and funds available to crime victims, see id. at 15‒19. 
 46. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
611, 611 (2009). 
 47. Id. at 614‒15. 
 48. Damon Pitt, No Payne, No Gain? Revisiting Victim Impact Statements After Twenty 
Years in Effect, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 475, 485 (2013). 
 49. Victim Impact Statements, supra note 25. 
916 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:909 
the victim is allowed to present a statement in court during the sentencing 
hearing.50  The presentation of the victim impact statement may take place in 
front of and be directed at the accused; however, this is not always the case.51 
New York provides an illustrative example of one approach to the victim 
impact statement process during pre-sentencing.  In New York, victims or their 
family members have the right to orally address the court on “any matter 
relevant” to sentencing.52  The judge maintains discretion to decide whether or 
not to allow a family member to speak.53  Judges can restrict the number of 
indirectly affected victims (i.e., family members) who may present statements 
during the pre-sentencing process.54  One study concerning the regulation of 
victim impact statements in New York found that only one-third to one-half of 
the families interviewed were allowed to face the offender at sentencing in 
order to present their impact statements.55 
Victim impact statements may also be presented to parole boards prior to or 
during parole hearings.56  This process is very similar to a victim impact 
statement presentation at a pre-sentencing hearing; it can be done in-person or 
through a written statement.57  As with pre-sentencing hearings, states vary on 
how and when they allow victims to present their statements.58  In order to 
highlight the differences, the Appendix describes the different presentation 
formats that states allow for victim impact statements at parole hearings.59  In 
some states, the victim may be present at the hearing, while in others victims 
may only submit written or oral statements to the board prior to the hearing.60 
                                                 
 50. Id. 
 51. Christine M. Englebrecht, Where Do I Stand?: An Exploration of the Rules that 
Regulate Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, 7 VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 161, 
167‒79 (2012). 
 52. Id. at 167. 
 53. Id. at 167‒68. 
 54. Id. at 167‒69. 
 55. Id. at 174. 
 56. Kathryn Morgan & Brent L. Smith, Victims, Punishment, and Parole: The Effect of 
Victim Participation on Parole Hearings, 4 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 334 (2005). 
 57. Id. at 336. 
 58. See Appendix.  While using victim impact statements varies based on the jurisdiction, 
the use of victim impact statements has proven controversial regarding its potential impact on 
components of the criminal justice process, such as sentence length and parole decisions.  Studies 
regarding the potential impact of victim impact statements have not found a definitive answer.  
See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of 
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 447 (2003); Bryan Myers, Steven J. Lynn & Jack 
Arbuthnot, Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgment: The Effects of Harm Information and 
Witness Demeanor, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2393, 2396 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg, 
Stephen P. Gravey & Martin T. Wells, Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in 
South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 318‒19 (2003); Morgan & Smith, supra 
note 56, at 333‒34; Pitt, supra note 48, at 488‒93. 
 59. See Appendix. 
 60. Nadler & Rose, supra note 58, at 427. 
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C.  The Future of Victims’ Rights in the States 
The expansion of victims’ rights at the state level continues seemingly 
unabated.61  For example, in 2013, Hawaii’s State Senate unanimously passed 
a constitutional amendment for victims’ rights, putting the state another step 
closer to a constitutional amendment in conjunction with its statutory 
provisions.62  In 2011, the Ohio Attorney General expanded the state’s 
compensation program by eliminating the ten year deadline for victims to file a 
claim.63  Likewise, the cap for fees on individual attorneys or law firms was 
eliminated.64  In 2013, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett signed legislation 
allowing crime victims and their families to speak directly to members of the 
State Board of Probation and Parole.65  Prior to this legislation, victims were 
only allowed to testify to the parole board through written statements and 
phone calls, but not in person.66 
Oftentimes state provisions exceed those that have been proposed or 
implemented federally.67  For instance, in 2013, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey ruled that a criminal defendant does not have the absolute right to miss 
his sentencing hearing when the victim is prepared to make a statement.68  This 
ruling was in response to a defendant who did not want to listen to the reading 
of the victim impact statement during sentencing.69  The unanimous court held 
that “[t]here can be little doubt that from the standpoint of the victims, who are 
to be treated with fairness, compassion, respect, and dignity, their statements at 
sentencing will carry more meaning if they are heard not only by the judge but 
the defendant as well.”70 
Victims have not only state-funded programs, but also those of many non-
governmental organizations at their disposal.  These programs provide 
resources to victims of crime at the national, state, and local levels.71  Non-
                                                 
 61. This is not to say that victims’ rights advocates lack concerns.  Some advocates argue 
that both federal and state victims’ rights provisions sometimes lack robust enforcement due to 
recalcitrance by some public authorities and attorneys, as well as a frequent lack of notice to 
victims.  See Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims’ Rights: From Illusion to Reality, 
24 CRIM. JUST. 4, 8‒9 (2009); Elizabeth N. Jones, The Ascending Role of Crime Victims in Plea-
Bargaining and Beyond, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 100, 129‒36 (2014). 
 62. S.B. 509, 27th Leg. (Haw. 2013). 
 63. Victims: Apply for Victim’s Compensation, OHIO ATT’Y GEN. MIKE DEWINE, http:// 
www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/victimscompensation.aspx/?from=nav. 
 64. Id. 
 65. H.B. 492, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 527‒28. 
 68. State v. Tedesco, 69 A.3d 103, 110 (N.J. 2013). 
 69. Id. at 106. 
 70. Id. at 114. 
 71. For an overview of such organizations, see Help for Crime Victims, THE NAT’L CTR. 
FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims [hereinafter 
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governmental victim services include counseling, transportation, mediation, 
medical services, training and education, financial assistance, crisis 
intervention, legal advocacy, legal services, child care, safe houses, and 
support groups.72  Well-known, nationwide interest groups, such as Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the National Center for Victims of 
Crime, are just two of many organizations that help victims construct a victim 
impact statement, guide them through the criminal justice process, and provide 
free counseling services.73  These groups often work in conjunction with the 
state to provide the fastest and most effective services for victims.74 
Between non-governmental organizations and state provisions it is clear that 
victims’ rights have expanded considerably since the 1960s and will continue 
to do so.  While discrepancies exist among the states in how vigorously 
victims’ rights are enforced, it is clear that they have led the way in creating a 
role for, and expanding the rights of, victims during the criminal justice 
process. 
II.  FEDERALISM AND THE PROPOSED VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AMENDMENT 
A.  History of the Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment 
Proposals to amend the U.S. Constitution to codify victims’ rights for all 
federal and state judicial proceedings have a long pedigree.75  These proposals 
originated from a report by the Task Force on Victims of Crime, which was 
convened by President Reagan in 1982.76  In its Final Report, the Task Force 
noted that the Bill of Rights has fewer protections for victims than the accused, 
and argued that a sentence should be added to the Sixth Amendment providing 
rights for victims to be present and heard in criminal prosecutions.77  As 
already noted, in 1986, victims’ rights advocates formed NVCAN to lobby for 
such a change.78 
                                                 
 
NCVC]; NACVCB, supra note 30; Victim Resources, NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST. 
https://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/for_victims/self_help/. 
 72. NCVC, supra note 71. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id.  For example, in July 2014, California passed SB 978, allowing medical 
providers, with a victim’s permission, to contact counseling centers when he or she is transported 
to a hospital for a medical evidentiary exam.  Prior to the bill, only law enforcement officers 
could contact counseling centers on behalf of victims. 
 75. For useful overviews of the proposed VRA’s history, see Cassell, supra note 3, at 
306‒08; Schwartz, supra note 21, at 525. 
 76. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 114‒15 (1982) 
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
 77. Id. at 114‒15. 
 78. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 526.  See also Victims’ Rights Amendment Introduced, 
NAT’L VICTIMS’ CONST. AMENDMENT PASSAGE, http://www.nvcap.org (providing further 
information about the NVCAN and its support for the passage of a constitutional amendment). 
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By the mid-1990s, the advocates for a constitutional amendment approached 
the Clinton Administration and members of both parties in Congress, which 
resulted in several versions of the amendment being introduced in the latter 
part of the decade.79  Those proposals had eight rights for victims of violent 
crime: notice of proceedings, to be present whenever the accused had a right to 
be present, to be heard at sentencing, notice of release or escape, a speedy trial, 
reasonable victim protection efforts, and notice of these rights.80  The 
proposals had numerous co-sponsors, and hearings were held before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, which approved the proposal in 1998.81  However, the 
full Senate never voted on the proposal.82 
A similar pattern occurred in the 2000s.  Again, with bi-partisan support, 
numerous co-sponsors, and the Bush Administration’s backing, VRAs similar 
to those from the 1990s were introduced in Congress.83  Hearings were held, 
and again the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported out a proposed 
VRA in 2003.84  Yet again, the full Senate took no action on the proposal, and 
no further significant activity on the VRA took place in that decade.85  
However, the attention bestowed on the VRA led to the passage of the Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) in 2004,86 which established a variety of rights in 
federal criminal proceedings that were similar to those in the proposed VRA.  
Indeed, the CVRA was the culmination of several earlier federal statutes, 
which in various ways established victims’ rights in federal criminal 
proceedings.87 
Several proposals for a VRA have been introduced in recent years.88  They 
were very similar to previously-proposed VRAs, with the one notable 
difference being the coverage of all crime victims, not just victims of violent 
                                                 
 79. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong., § 1 (1996). 
 80. Id. 
 81. S. REP. NO. 105-409 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Senate Report]. 
 82. For further details on congressional activity on the proposed VRA in the 1990s, see 
Cassell, supra note 3, at 307; Schwartz, supra note 21, at 527‒28. 
 83. S. REP. NO. 108-191, 195‒96 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Senate Report]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. For further details on congressional activity on the proposed VRA in the 2000s, see 
Cassell, supra note 3, at 307‒08. 
 86. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 101-04, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004).  For 
discussion of the passage and provisions of the CVRA, see Cassell, supra note 3, at 308‒12. 
 87. Cassell, supra note 3, at 304‒05 (referring to the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, the 
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the Victim Rights 
Clarification Act of 1997); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 61‒65 (minority views of Sens. 
Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer & Durbin) (referring to other federal laws, such as the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, the 
Crime Victims With Disabilities Awareness Act of 1998, the Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998, 
and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000). 
 88. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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crimes.89  However, the renewed proposal did not pass the 113th Congress.90  
Perhaps the successes of the victims’ rights movement in the states and by 
congressional statute are a contributing factor in the decreased congressional 
interest in passing the VRA.  The need for the VRA may seem diminished in 
light of these other laws.91  Falling crime rates may also play a factor.  Still, it 
seems unlikely that it will fall from the political agenda, or that there will be no 
further efforts to pass the VRA.92 
Nonetheless, it is worth asking why, despite what one VRA critic called the 
“extraordinary political popularity of victims’ rights,”93 the formidable, 
bipartisan support for the VRA, and the considerable activity in Congress, the 
VRA has to date never received a full vote in (much less passage by) either 
chamber of Congress.  No doubt, the sheer difficulty of passing any 
constitutional amendment explains much of the reason why. Consider the 
recent failure of repeated efforts to pass anti-flag burning amendments, to 
balance the budget, or to create term limits for members of Congress, all of 
which enjoyed public support like the VRA.94  Another reason is that the VRA 
does indeed face formidable opposition.  High-level interest groups like the 
National Governors’ Association and many state attorneys general supported 
the various iterations of the VRA.95  However, the VRA was opposed by an 
impressive array of well-known organizations, including the U.S. Judicial 
Conference, the lobbying arm of the federal courts, the Conference of Chief 
Justices, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
American Civil Liberties Union, and even a variety of victims’ rights 
organizations.96  Collectively, these groups advanced many reasons for their 
opposition, including that federal or state statutes were preferable to address 
                                                 
 89. Cassell, supra note 3, at 313. 
 90. BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 3, at 731. 
 91. Id.  See also Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in the 
System of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims’ Act, 105 NW. U. L. 
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constitutional amendment “in the short term” and instead pressed for federal legislation). 
 92. For example, the 2012 Platform of the Republican Party favorably referred to the VRA 
while still not expressly endorsing its passage.  See id.  The 2012 Democratic Party Platform for 
2012 made no reference to the VRA.  See The 2012 Democratic National Party Platform, N.Y. 
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 93. Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 
443, 445.  See also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 742‒43 (2013) (discussing the legislative success of crime victims 
groups, including their unique “ability to generate a wealth of public sympathy, an enormously 
powerful weapon in politics, particularly when used in conjunction with media coverage”). 
 94. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 3‒6. 
 95. Id. (summarizing the legislative history of efforts to pass the VRA in the 1990s and 
2000s). 
 96. Id. at 59‒61 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & 
Durbin) (listing these and other groups). 
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victims’ rights, that state efforts could prove to be or were already adequate, 
and that it was an inappropriate distraction to devote the resources necessary to 
convince at least three-fourths of the states to ratify an amendment.97  
Presently, the latter rationales seem to have carried the day; however, that does 
not necessarily mean the debate has ended. 
B.  The VRA and the Values of Federalism 
Many issues drove the debate over the VRA.  The core substantive issue was 
the normative one of permitting a new party to participate in criminal 
proceedings, and whether that improperly impacted the ability of the accused 
to present a defense against the state.98  Related practical issues concerned the 
precise language and interpretation of VRA provisions.99  Further discussion of 
those arguments is beyond the scope of this Article, as this Article is 
principally concerned with the federalism implications of the VRA.  This 
section of the Article first summarizes and critically evaluates the extant 
discussions of the federalism implications of the VRA.  It then focuses on the 
related aspect of whether and to what extent federal courts would be expected 
to enforce state compliance with the VRA requirements. 
1.  Political Posturing on the VRA and a Functional Analysis of Federalism 
Ratification of the VRA would nationalize victims’ rights, which until now 
have been left to the vagaries of each state’s law.  VRA supporters have always 
acknowledged this point, but defended the imposition on the states on various 
grounds.  The Task Force established by President Reagan argued, though not 
elaborately, that a constitutional amendment was necessary as a symbolic 
matter and to achieve efficacy, uniformity, and permanence for victims’ 
rights.100  Later, supporters renewed these arguments during the congressional 
debates over the VRA.101  Their principal argument was that victims’ rights 
were equally important to the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings— 
that is, those enumerated in the Bill of Rights.102  Because most of those rights 
had been incorporated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
                                                 
 97. Id. (summarizing these views).  For discussions of how prosecutors and other traditional 
participants in the criminal justice system may resent the perceived interference by victims, see 
Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 
1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 300‒01, 301 n.43, 322; Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ 
Rights? The Nature of the Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S 
J. LEGAL COMM. 157, 159‒60 (1992). 
 98. Cassell, supra note 3, at 304. 
 99. For examples of the scholarly debate over the VRA, see id. at 301 n.1 (listing scholarly 
sources both supporting and criticizing the VRA). 
 100. FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 114‒15. 
 101. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 754, 764‒75 (2010) (discussing the 
Incorporation Doctrine in the Supreme Court and the incorporated rights resulting therefrom). 
 102. See id. at 767‒68. 
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Amendment and thus were binding on the states,103 they argued that victims’ 
rights should apply to the states in a parallel fashion.104  Only in that way 
would victims’ rights be uniformly guaranteed throughout the country, they 
argued.105  Supporters also argued that the nationalization of victims’ rights 
would not end state developments on the topic because the VRA would permit 
states “latitude to accommodate legitimate local interests.”106  Put another way, 
they argued, the VRA would establish a floor for victims’ rights that states 
could supplement.107 
Critics of the VRA countered all of these arguments.  They contended that 
the quest for uniformity was elusive, as they predicted that implementation of 
some of the broad language of the VRA would lead to various interpretations 
by different states, and thus create a “patchwork” of protections for victims.108  
Critics further argued that there was considerable state activity establishing 
victims’ rights, so a federal mandate was unnecessary and could stifle state 
innovation in this field.109  Furthermore, they added that the VRA was similar 
to an unfunded mandate that could impose enormous implementation costs on 
the states.110 
In surveying some of these arguments, the most prominent academic 
supporter of the VRA, Professor Paul Cassell, argued that the “inconsistency . . 
. is . . . breathtaking.”111  He supported this charge by observing that many of 
the critics of the VRA were staunch supporters of the Supreme Court’s 
federalization of “a whole host of criminal justice issues ranging from the right 
to counsel, to Miranda, to death penalty procedures, [and] to search and 
                                                 
 103. See id. at 764‒65. 
 104. Cassell, supra note 3, at 316‒17. 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 316‒18; 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 11‒12; 2003 Senate 
Report, supra note 83, at 15‒16.  Even some supporters of the VRA nonetheless expressed 
concerns about the “federalization of crime and the nationalization of our criminal justice 
system.”  1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 44 (views of Sen. Hatch). 
 106. Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights 
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479, 532. 
 107. Twist & Seiden, supra note 1, at 360‒61. 
 108. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 546‒47.  See also 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 
68‒71 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, & Kuhl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 
71 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin). 
 109. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 547; Mosteller, supra note 93, at 444‒45; 1998 Senate 
Report, supra note 81, at 69‒71 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, & Kohl).  It was 
argued that all of the state activity on behalf of victims differentiated the VRA from the 
nationalization of rights accomplished by the Fourteenth Amendment, because in the latter 
circumstance many states did not protect the rights of the newly freed slaves.  2003 Senate 
Report, supra note 83, at 71‒72 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, 
Schumer, & Durbin). 
 110. 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 62‒64 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, 
& Kohl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 79‒82, 92 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, 
Kennedy, Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin). 
 111. Cassell, supra note 106, at 531. 
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seizure rules, among many others[.]”112  Cassell’s critique can extend to other 
arguments made by the critics.  For example, critics of the VRA typically have 
supported the nationalization of federal constitutional and statutory rights in a 
wide variety of contexts without lodging concerns similar to those they have 
about the VRA.  Yet Cassell’s critique is more powerful because it also applies 
to many of the arguments made by supporters.  To his credit, Cassell 
acknowledges that many VRA supporters have typically been critics of the 
incorporation doctrine.113  This time, though, he waves off the inconsistency, 
arguing that “it is unlikely that we will ever retreat from our national 
commitment to afford criminal defendants basic rights,” and supporters of the 
VRA are now simply asking for “parallel treatment.”114 
Inconsistency in addressing federalism issues is not confined to the victims’ 
rights arena.  Generally, most conservatives support the VRA, but are typically 
skeptical of federal authority displacing state prerogatives or requiring states to 
follow federal mandates without good reasons.  On the other hand, most 
liberals are critical of the VRA, yet typically support federal laws mandating 
national uniformity and state compliance to confront social and political 
problems.115  Still, it remains easy to find exceptions to these generalizations in 
areas other than the debate over the VRA.  For example, consider the 
incorporation of the Second Amendment.  In McDonald v. City of Chicago,116 
the Supreme Court concluded that the right to bear arms under the Second 
Amendment applied to the states.117  The interest groups urging the Court to 
render this holding, which limited the ability of states to enact gun control 
measures, created alliances between traditionally adversarial groups.  Thirty-
eight state attorneys general, who presumably would favor states’ rights, filed 
an amicus curiae brief in favor of this result.118 
Similarly, some interest groups that often oppose federal mandates favored 
the VRA despite the fact that it limits state innovation via a constitutional 
amendment.  No less than forty-nine governors and forty-nine state attorneys 
                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 531 n.277 (citing Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—
And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701‒02 
(1988); Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State Constitutional 
Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 63‒70 (1996)). 
 114. Id. at 531. 
 115. See Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, 37, 37 (2012) 
(discussing the skepticism progressives and liberals usually have for federalism). 
 116. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 117. Id. at 791.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that 
the District of Columbia’s ban on handgun possession in the home violated the Second 
Amendment). 
 118. Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of 
Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 359‒60 (2012).  The attorneys general of three states 
filed an amicus brief arguing for the opposite result.  Id. at 401. 
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general at various times publicly supported VRA proposals in Congress.119  
But a lack of consistency in American law and politics is hardly limited to 
support or opposition to the VRA.  Elected officials, interest groups, and the 
public at large are all often result-oriented toward federalism and other issues.  
They all may take seemingly counterintuitive positions on federalism issues 
due to an electoral advantage on a particular issue, the desire to place 
responsibility on the federal government, or the perception that the resolution 
of a problem, or lack thereof, in one state has a spillover effect.120  In these 
circumstances, a federal, uniform position may provide a resolution.121 
The now-standard arguments for or against the VRA are interesting and 
important; however, they are largely normative in nature.  Specifically, if 
someone favors a robust conception of victims’ rights, it would seem that he or 
she would support the VRA, with the reverse being true, as well.  These 
arguments would benefit from a more sustained attention to a functional 
analysis of federalism.  A rich academic literature in American law, politics, 
and economics has developed several rationales for federalism that can be 
utilized to measure arguments for or against a proposed federal resolution to a 
particular issue.122  These rationales center on the idea that states are better 
equipped to fashion solutions that are amenable to their respective 
citizenries.123  Citizens and businesses that disagree with particular policies in 
a state can vote by moving elsewhere if they disagree vehemently enough.  In 
this way, states can serve as laboratories of experimentation, which other 
states, and indeed the federal government, may follow.  On the other hand, 
state policies may have negative spillover effects in other states and spark 
races-to-the-bottom among states, which suggests that interstate collaboration 
is appropriate on an issue, or that a national resolution is beneficial.124 
                                                 
 119. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 3‒4 (governors supported VRA by 49‒1 vote in 
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competition is a race to the top, a race to the bottom, or perhaps neither.  See, e.g., Michael W. 
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These factors can apply to analyzing the efficacy of federal or state 
regulation of criminal law and procedure.125  On this account, crime negatively 
affects states and local communities, and states can respond by, among other 
solutions, pursuing policies that encourage criminals and criminal activity to 
shift to other states.126  One way to accomplish this goal is by making criminal 
investigations and prosecutions easier, as well as increasing jail sentences, 
compared to neighboring states.127  In turn, this inter-jurisdictional competition 
can be conceptualized as a race-to-the-bottom because negative effects are 
exported to other states, and thus states are encouraged to apply increasingly 
harsher sanctions or policies than they might otherwise to counter this result.128  
State cooperation or federal intervention are two potential paths to counter 
these issues.129 
Consider how these criteria apply to the development of crime victims’ 
rights among the states.  Establishing and increasing such rights increases the 
sanction for criminal activity in several senses because a new actor—the 
victim—can enter the criminal justice process, almost always on the side of the 
prosecutor.  Knowing this, potential criminals may be incentivized to relocate 
their illicit activities to other states.  In turn, states might be encouraged to 
develop victims’ rights to a degree that they might not otherwise.  It would 
                                                 
 
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1500 (1987) 
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MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1737‒45 (2006); Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: 
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the federal government); Logan, supra note 7, at 88‒103 (asserting that federal statutes, which 
since 1994 have heavily regulated state policy toward sex offenders, violate traditional norms of 
federalism, including state autonomy and experimentation); Janet Moore, Democracy 
Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 543, 550 (arguing that 
reforms in criminal procedure should take place at the state level despite hostility or indifference 
by the courts). 
 126. Teichman, supra note 125, at 1838‒39. 
 127. Id. at 1839‒40. 
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seems to suggest that it displaces criminal activity to other states.  Id. at 1843‒48. 
 129. Id. at 1866. 
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seem that these effects are relatively weak.  Even if potential criminals engage 
in a rigorous ex ante cost-benefit analysis with regard to criminal activity, it is 
unlikely that they give much weight to whether or not victims are engaged in 
the formal criminal process.  The applicable sanctions and the likelihood of a 
successful prosecution are likely to be more important.  The role of victims is 
not irrelevant; however, it likely plays a secondary role regarding the 
possibility of criminals relocating to other states.130  States are typically 
concerned with victims who live or are victimized in their own state.  
Regarding victims’ rights, then, “[g]iven all the other pressures that bear on 
criminal justice policy, interjurisdictional competition to displace crime does 
not appear to be a major force that shapes the system.”131 
The application of functional justifications for federalism shows that the 
proposed VRA is not appropriate.  As developed in Part I, all states have 
established victims’ rights, but the kinds of rights and the level of their 
enforcement differs among the states.  Uniformity does not exist, and it can be 
argued that some states enforce victims’ rights more effectively than others.  
The Appendix highlights some of these important and varying differences 
between states. 
However, it does not follow that the VRA is the appropriate solution for 
these inconsistencies.  The level of protection of victims’ rights appears to 
have relatively minimal interstate effects, and in particular few, if any, 
interstate externalities.  The benefits and costs of victims’ rights seem largely 
internalized within each state.  Thus, to the extent states compete to increase 
victims’ rights, it appears to be a race-to-the-top.  States may have a variety of 
reasons, from mundane budgetary concerns to apprehensions about changing 
traditional criminal procedure, to not adopt or enforce a panoply of victims’ 
rights.  Conversely, other states might consider it good policy and politics to 
adopt and vigorously enforce victims’ rights.  This experimentation should 
play out on a state-by-state basis, and as the state laws and practices survey in 
Part I demonstrates, states have continued to experiment.  Consequently, 
federal intervention through the VRA or in other ways, at least at present, is 
unnecessary. 
2.  Federal Court Enforcement of the VRA 
Another way federalism concerns arose during the debates over the proposed 
VRA was how federal courts may enforce its provisions against the states.132  
Some states allow crime victims to file civil suits for money damages,133 but 
no proposed version of the VRA has ever contained such a provision.  The 
                                                 
 130. Perhaps this conclusion would change as victims’ rights become more established in 
state criminal procedure and victims come to exercise their rights more vigorously. 
 131. Samuel R. Gross, Jurisdictional Competition in Criminal Justice: How Much Does It 
Really Happen?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1725, 1732 (2006). 
 132. See Mosteller, supra note 93, at 451. 
 133. Cassell, supra note 3, at 333‒34, 334 n.219; supra Part I.A. 
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reasons for this omission were avowedly pragmatic because such suits raise 
potentially complex issues, including how such an action might affect plea-
bargaining, as well as other aspects of the criminal process.134  The language of 
the VRA did not mandate a damages remedy, and its availability, supporters 
said, was for Congress and the states to decide.135 
However, that left unresolved the issue of how VRA requirements might be 
enforced against states by actions for declaratory or injunctive relief in federal 
court.136  The silence of the VRA on this issue, and the express exception for 
only damages actions, would seem to leave open the possibility of such 
relief.137  Supporters of the VRA seem to acknowledge this point, but were 
untroubled by any federalism implications because, as they observed, other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights are routinely enforced by criminal defendants 
as defenses to state prosecutions.138 
In contrast, critics of the VRA expressed great concern regarding possible 
federal court supervision of state criminal procedures in order to enforce the 
requirements of the VRA.139  They emphasized that, not unlike the long history 
of prison reform litigation, injunctive suits in federal court, especially those 
brought as class actions, would impose potentially enormous monetary costs 
on a state and intrude on the daily operations of its criminal justice system.140  
Indeed, they further observed, the conference of state chief justices opposed 
the adoption of the VRA for this reason.141 
These respective arguments contain inconsistencies, some of which could be 
described as breathtaking.142  Typically, most conservative supporters of the 
                                                 
 134. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 333‒34. 
 135. Id. at 333; 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 84.  According to VRA supporters, a 
victim could not file a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce rights guaranteed under 
the VRA.  Cassell, supra note 3, at 334.  Under existing law, courts have also rejected § 1983 
damage actions by victims against public officials for alleged failures to protect existing rights.  
See, e.g., Pusey v. Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657‒58 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 136. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 536.  Such actions could also be brought in state court, but 
they would not present the federalism issues addressed in this article. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Cassell, supra note 3, at 335; Twist & Seiden, supra note 1, at 362. 
 139. 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 71‒72 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, 
& Kohl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 92‒93 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, 
Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin). 
 140. 1998 Senate Report, supra note 81, at 71‒72 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, 
& Kohl); 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 93 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, 
Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin). 
 141. 2003 Senate Report, supra note 83, at 92‒93 (minority views of Sens. Leahy, Kennedy, 
Kohl, Feingold, Schumer, & Durbin). 
 142. However, not all of the arguments are inconsistent.  For example, Republican Senator 
Fred Thompson opposed the VRA because of its intrusion on state prerogatives, including the 
likelihood of federal court supervision of state criminal proceedings.  1998 Senate Report, supra 
note 81, at 47‒49.  Likewise, Professor Robert Mosteller, a critic of the VRA, did not seem 
troubled by the prospect of federal court intervention, and indeed conceded that it would increase 
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VRA would otherwise be critical of federal court injunctive actions that 
monitor state institutions such as schools, prisons, or mental health facilities, 
often at great cost to the state, to enforce compliance with federal 
constitutional rights.143  Critics charge that such actions effectively vest 
executive and legislative power in federal judges, far beyond the scope of 
power traditionally held by courts.144  Conversely, most liberal critics of the 
VRA have embraced such federal court actions in other contexts as necessary 
to compel recalcitrant states to follow federal constitutional norms.145 
If the VRA were adopted, and declaratory or injunctive relief actions were 
permitted and inevitably filed, it is likely that such actions would neither be as 
uncontroversial as the VRA’s supporters suggest, nor as disruptive as its critics 
argue.  The history of similar institutional reform litigation in federal courts 
indicates the likelihood of this conclusion.146  Injunctive actions in federal 
court against state action in general, and institutional reform litigation in 
particular, have long been controversial.147  While such actions were especially 
and successfully utilized in the Civil Rights Movement, not all federal judges 
embraced them, and Congress has passed legislation limiting the ability of 
litigants to seek injunctive relief.148  Depending on various factors, including 
local conditions, the state institution involved, and the scope of the injunctive 
relief sought, such actions have sometimes not been especially controversial.149  
Instead, structural reform litigation has, on occasion, “stabilized as a form of 
litigation with a range of generally accepted remedies in a few leading cases 
and imitated elsewhere.”150 
A similar pattern may follow if federal courts were called upon to enforce 
the VRA.  All states have constitutional or statutory protections for victims’ 
rights, so being required to follow the broad language of rights enumerated in 
the VRA would not present a monumental shift.  States would argue that they 
are already complying with the VRA.  No doubt, some victims would disagree 
                                                 
 
the “effectiveness of victims’ rights,” while still ultimately opposing it.  Mosteller, supra note 93, 
at 451. 
 143. See supra notes 139‒42 and accompanying text. 
 144. See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT 
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN THE GOVERNMENT 150‒61 (2003). 
 145. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public 
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). 
 146. For an excellent overview, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural 
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387 (2007). 
 147. S. Gene Fendler, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Criminal Proceedings: 
From Young to Younger, 32 LA. L. REV. 601, 601 (1972). 
 148. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 146, at 1395‒97, 1408‒12 (discussing Congressional 
restrictions and federal judicial behavior). 
 149. Id. at 1411‒12. 
 150. Id. at 1412.  For similar conclusions, see Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions 
Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 565 (2006). 
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and argue that the state law provisions, either facially or as-applied, are 
deficient.  In turn, they might file a lawsuit in federal court seeking an order to 
force full state compliance with the mandates of the VRA.  The outcome of 
these lawsuits would inevitably vary from state to state, but it is difficult to 
believe that there would be endless and massive intrusions by federal courts.  
Most federal judges and state officials would not have the appetite for such 
litigation.  Rather, such litigation would probably lead to some reforms in 
states as needed, and sooner or later recede into the background.151 
C.  The Fate of the Victims’ Rights Amendment 
Calling for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution is no small task.  The 
adoption of the VRA is unjustified based on the values of federalism.  While 
federal courts would likely adopt a modest, incremental approach in enforcing 
the VRA, should it be enacted, the VRA should not be implemented at all.  The 
benefits and burdens of expanding or diminishing victims’ rights are largely 
confined to the states, and a uniform federal law is unnecessary.  Nonetheless, 
support for the VRA will likely continue.  Many supporters will disagree with 
the assessments of this article on federalism grounds and conclude that the 
VRA’s apparent uniformity is necessary.  Others may support the VRA as a 
matter of symbolic politics.  Consequently, the proposed adoption of the VRA 
is unlikely to fade from the policy agenda. 
III.  VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
Absent the VRA, federal courts would still have a significant role in 
adjudicating and enforcing victims’ rights established by federal statutes with 
regard to federal criminal actions in those courts.  Victims’ rights established 
by state law would be resolved primarily in state courts.  Each sovereign would 
operate on its own terms.  An exception to this strict dichotomy occurs in the 
adjudication of federal habeas corpus actions in federal court.152  In those 
actions, federal courts review claims by prisoners that their state criminal 
convictions violated their federal constitutional rights.153  This section outlines 
the, at times, complicated and contentious history of federal habeas actions, 
                                                 
 151. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
781, 828‒30 (2006) (suggesting that structural reform litigation regarding “criminal justice 
institutions” could be effected through institutional injunctions). 
 152. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 410 (1963).  Another exception would be the infrequent 
instances when the U.S. Supreme Court directly reviews state court adjudications of victims’ 
rights.  See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that the state did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment in permitting a victim impact statement in the sentencing phase of 
a capital case). 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).  This article does not address the other type of habeas actions 
that can be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 regarding claims of prisoners in 
federal custody. 
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and then examines the curious history of the enforcement of victims’ rights in 
federal habeas litigation. 
Shortly after the Civil War, Congress statutorily granted federal judges the 
authority to hear constitutional claims from persons convicted in state court 
seeking a writ of habeas corpus.154  That authority was narrowly construed for 
decades because it was often limited to circumstances where the state court 
lacked personal jurisdiction, thus resulting in few writs being granted.155  This 
narrow application ceased during the Warren Court for two reasons.  First, the 
Court incorporated many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights concerning 
criminal proceedings to the states, thus expanding the list of potential 
constitutional violations in state courts.156  Second, the Court expanded the 
procedural ambit of the federal habeas statutes by permitting writs to be issued 
even when claims had not been fully presented to state courts.157  The 
conventional wisdom for the change is that the Court was driven by the 
perception that state judges and institutions were incapable of vigorously 
protecting the constitutional rights of the accused.158 
These developments, permitting federal judges to superintend state criminal 
procedures, were very controversial on and off the Court.  On the Court, more 
conservative decisions from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts curtailed the 
Warren Court’s expansive decisions by highlighting the costs of habeas, such 
as the value of finality in state court convictions, the quality of state court 
judging, and the balance of federalism.159  Off the Court, the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and other groups lobbied the Court 
in favor of those results and Congress to amend the habeas statutes to codify 
and extend these more restrictive interpretations.160  Those efforts culminated 
in 1996 with the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
                                                 
 154. Katy J. Harriger, The Federalism Debate in the Transformation of Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 27 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 1, 3 (1997). 
 155. History of the Federal Judiciary: Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FED. 
JUD. CTR., www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_habeas.html (last visited July 25, 
2015). 
 156. Harriger, supra note 154, at 3. 
 157. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 438 (holding that habeas petitions could be heard in cases where 
the petition had not been presented in state court, unless the prisoner deliberately bypassed state 
procedures). 
 158. For overviews of these developments, see NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, 
HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT 
WRIT 6‒11, 48‒60 (2011); Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in 
State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 798‒805 (2009). 
 159. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 61‒66; MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. 
WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 120‒21 
(1999). 
 160. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 121.  For further discussion of the post-
Warren Court debate over habeas corpus, see Harriger, supra note 154, at 9‒20; Larry W. Yackle, 
The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2349‒73 (1993). 
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(AEDPA).161  This law creates a one-year statute of limitations to bring habeas 
petitions after exhausting state remedies, speeds up the protracted litigation of 
habeas suits in capital cases; and provides that habeas relief can only be 
awarded when a state court acts contrary to “clearly established federal law,” 
as determined by the Supreme Court.162 
The lengthy and contentious debate over the scope and application of federal 
habeas can obscure how difficult it is for a state prisoner to convince a federal 
judge to issue a writ.  The changes in law effectuated by the Warren Court 
likely encouraged prisoners to file petitions in U.S. District Courts.  Petitions 
rose from 560 filed in 1950, to 5,000 annually in the 1960s, to 9,000 by 1970, 
and to about 15,000 today.163  However, this spike in the number of habeas 
applications was not correlative with the number granted.  Even at the zenith of 
the Warren Court, federal judges granted only three to four percent of the 
petitions filed.164  Only one to two percent of petitions were granted in 
subsequent decades.165  The subset of petitions filed in cases where the death 
penalty was available presents a different picture, with up to forty percent 
being granted.166  The grant rate for the noncapital subset of petitions thus falls 
below one percent.167  The latter figure is due to the more complicated 
substantive and procedural law that governs capital cases, coupled with their 
higher stakes and generally being more vigorously argued.168  There is a robust 
debate over what accounts for the low rate of petitioner success, especially in 
non-capital cases169 and what can be done to change it, if anything.170 
                                                 
 161. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996), codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code. 
 162. For discussion of the provisions of AEDPA, see Hoffman & King, supra note 158, at 
805‒06. 
 163. KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 60; SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 
122.  See also McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1943 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
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noncapital habeas cases). 
 169. Cf. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 124 (arguing that the low rate indicates 
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due to the accused to raise their rights); HOFFMAN & KING, supra note 158, at 796‒98 (arguing 
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services); John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital 
Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435 (2011) (taking issue with 
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Still, this narrative lacks any reference to the victims’ rights movement.  One 
explanation for this absence may be because the leaders of that movement 
were not particularly concerned with federal habeas litigation.171  Likewise, it 
appears that most victims were primarily interested in the resolution of the 
original criminal trials and less so in post-trial proceedings, including habeas 
litigation.172  Indeed, both supporters and critics of the VRA, at least in the 
2003 iteration, took pains to emphasize that victims’ rights laws would not 
apply in federal habeas proceedings.173  Perhaps this reticence is due to the fact 
that victims were rarely involved in habeas cases.  Alternatively, it might be 
because almost all federal habeas litigation is resolved on a paper record and 
evidentiary hearings are rarely held.174  Thus, there is no forum for victims to 
speak their mind on any issue in open court, though they could presumably still 
submit a brief or some other written statement. 
Perhaps reflecting this reticence, the CVRA, passed in 2004 in the wake of 
the abandonment of the effort to pass the VRA in 2003, made no reference to 
victims’ rights in habeas cases.175  However, that changed two years later with 
the passage of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
(AWCPSA).176  One minor provision of that wide-ranging law expressly 
establishes victims’ rights in federal habeas litigation.177  It is similar, but not 
identical, to the list of victims’ rights in federal criminal trials established by 
                                                 
 
Hoffman & King’s arguments); Aziz Z. Hug, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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see Hug, supra note 170 at 536‒38. 
 175. Victims’ Rights: Crime Victims’ Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice. 
gov/usao/briefing_room/vw/rights.html (last updated July 8, 2015). 
 176. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 616 
(2006).  The habeas provision is in Title II, § 212.  For an overview of the AWCPSA, see Wayne 
A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, Present and Future, 34 
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 3 (2008). 
 177. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 616 
(2006). 
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the CVRA.  The AWCPSA states that victims have “right[s] not to be excluded 
from any such public court proceeding,” “to be reasonably heard at any public 
proceeding in the district court,” “to proceedings free from unreasonable 
delay,” and “to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s 
dignity and privacy.”178  Notably, the AWCPSA does not include a right of 
notification to the victim, though state law might still require victim 
notification of federal proceedings.179 
The rationale for including the provisions on victim participation in habeas 
proceedings in the AWCPSA is unclear from the legislative history, which 
makes only passing reference to these habeas provisions.180  Presumably they 
are related to concerns with those convicted of crimes against juveniles 
eventually seeking habeas relief in an attempt to set aside state trial results.181 
The habeas provisions of the CVRA have been subject to relatively little 
adjudication.  The most prominent discussion is the decision of the Fourth 
Circuit in Brandt v. Gooding,182 a habeas case with a relatively unusual set of 
facts.183  The habeas petitioner had previously sued his former lawyer for legal 
malpractice in state court.184  The court found the plaintiff guilty of criminal 
contempt for introducing a fraudulent letter into those proceedings.185  The 
conviction was affirmed and the former plaintiff, now a state prisoner, filed a 
writ of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court.186  The petitioner moved to 
intervene in that proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 to file a 
memorandum to correct what she saw as misstatements of fact made by the 
habeas petitioner when the latter moved for summary judgment.187  She sought 
to utilize the CVRA provisions permitting victims in state proceedings to 
                                                 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(2)(A) (2012) (referencing rights found in section 3771(a)(3)‒(4), 
(7)‒(8)). 
 179. CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: ADAM WALSH CHILD 
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 185. Id. at 130. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 131‒32. 
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intervene in federal habeas proceedings.188  The district judge denied the 
motion to intervene, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.189 
Petitioner argued that the CVRA permitted her to intervene, thus granting 
her intervention under Rule 24(a)(1).190  Alternatively, she contended that the 
CVRA independently granted a right to intervene to vindicate her “right to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding . . . involving release . . . .”191  The 
court dismissed the first argument because the CVRA does not guarantee a 
right to intervene.192  Rejecting the petitioner’s second argument, however, 
proved more challenging for the court.193  The court agreed that a habeas 
petition initiated a “public proceeding” under the CVRA.194  Because most 
habeas cases are resolved on the pleadings and a paper record, the court 
continued, a crime victim could submit documents to be “heard” at the public 
proceeding.195 
However, the court concluded that a formal intervention did not need to be 
granted to vindicate that right.196  The legislative history of the CVRA, the 
court stated, does not demand that “reasonably heard” be the equivalent of an 
“in-person right to be heard.”197  The court continued that in circumstances 
such as here, where the district judge ruled on the petition based on a paper 
record, the right to be “reasonably heard” was vindicated when the district 
judge construed her motion to intervene as an amicus curiae brief.198  Such a 
brief, the court concluded, provided petitioner with “a full and fair opportunity, 
under the CVRA, to provide information and communicate her views to the 
court.”199 
Other courts have followed Brandt,200 as it reached the correct result.  Most 
habeas cases are decided on a paper record, and it would be unnecessary in 
almost all other circumstances to schedule a hearing solely for the victim to 
speak in court.  Because habeas cases are akin to appellate litigation, in that 
habeas courts do not hold trials de novo, the interests of the victim to be heard 
                                                 
 188. Id. at 131. 
 189. Id. at 132. 
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2015] Federalism, Federal Courts, and Victims' Rights 935 
would usually be satisfied by the opportunity to file an amicus brief.201  Of 
course, the distinction between an intervener and an amicus is readily apparent.  
The former assumes all of the powers and responsibilities of a party, and can 
engage in discovery, file motions, formally participate in all hearings, and in 
some form have a veto over some decisions made by other parties.202  In 
contrast, the filer’s power is exhausted when the amicus brief is filed.203  That 
brief may be eloquent and persuasive, but it cannot be buttressed by further 
legal involvement of the victim.204  Nonetheless, the right to be heard under the 
CVRA is conditional, as it must be “reasonable,” and, therefore, in most 
habeas cases the opportunity to file an amicus brief encompasses that right.205 
Brandt tailored its holding to the circumstances of that case, implying that a 
different view might be appropriate in other habeas cases.206  For example, if 
there was an evidentiary hearing, the victim may be afforded an opportunity to 
speak in person.  It is unlikely that the victim would be a formal party in such a 
scenario, as Gooding sought in Brandt,207 but rather an interested witness.  
This would supplement or replace the opportunity to file an amicus brief. 
Whether in-person or by amicus brief, the victim could address legal issues and 
also, if desired, the impact of the crime on his or her life.  It might seem odd 
initially to permit a victims’ impact statement in a federal habeas 
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petitioner in most noncapital habeas cases, the lack of incentives to compromise given the costs 
already incurred, and the difficulty associated with determining what court has authority to revise 
a sentence.  KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 82‒83.  See also Anup Malani, Habeas 
Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 31‒38 (2006).  Despite these obstacles, Professor Malani has 
argued that there can and should be more attempts to settle habeas cases.  Id. at 39‒51.  Professor 
Malani makes no specific reference to victims being involved in the settlement regime he 
advocates.  However, should such a culture of settlement in habeas cases arise, victims can and 
should be consulted by appropriate counsel regarding the propriety of a settlement. 
 207. Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 136 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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proceeding.208  This might be so because at the habeas stage the court is not 
pondering the appropriate sentence after a conviction,209 but instead only the 
presence of constitutional errors in previous proceedings.  Yet such a statement 
should be permitted, even if it is not directly applicable to the factual and legal 
issues present in the proceeding.210 
There are several reasons supporting this assertion.  First, the habeas 
jurisdiction of the federal courts presents an acute problem of federalism.  It is 
a conspicuous exception to the usual steps of civil or criminal litigation where, 
with rare exceptions, parties get only one chance to fully litigate their case.  
Thus, federal habeas jurisdiction is an exception to res judicata, so a convicted 
state prisoner has the opportunity to litigate his conviction again, at least 
regarding federal constitutional issues, even after his trial has ended and 
appeals have been exhausted.211  This intrusion into the finality of state 
criminal procedures has resulted in considerable controversy and driven much 
of the change in habeas procedures since the end of the Warren Court.212 
However, an all-or-nothing response to this intrusion is unnecessary.  A 
middle ground between a total repeal of habeas and a robust revival of Warren 
Court principles would be to acknowledge the careful balancing act of federal 
judges adjudicating state criminal procedures and to show a willingness to 
weigh the unique factors of each case.213  One way to accomplish this goal is to 
be open-minded to the participation of victims in habeas proceedings, not only 
through amicus briefs on legal issues, but also through oral or written victim 
impact statements.214  A victim impact statement in a habeas proceeding may 
                                                 
 208. See DOYLE, supra note 179, at 20 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he usual form of a victim’s 
being heard, the victim impact statement, has no real place in a habeas proceeding.”). 
 209. See BELOOF, CASSELL & TWIST, supra note 3, at 567 (explaining that a VIS in state or 
federal court is typically made at the sentencing stage). 
 210. It is not entirely uncommon for victims to be present during hearings in federal habeas 
cases, though they may not make statements, even when invited.  There are also other instances, 
besides Brandt v. Gooding, of victims being permitted to participate in limited ways in federal 
habeas proceedings.  For example, in Gillispie v. Timmerman-Cooper, No. 3:09-cv-471, 2013 
WL 526481 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2013), the court denied the State’s Motion for Stay Pending 
Appeal after it had granted a writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at *6.  The state government filed a notice 
of appeal, and the court subsequently scheduled a bond hearing, at which the victims were set to 
testify.  Merz email, supra note 206.  Reportedly the victims would have contested the court’s 
holding, which was based in part on questioning of their eyewitness testimony.  Id.  The hearing 
was later cancelled and the victims’ testimony was not taken.  Id. 
 211. See Harriger, supra note 154, at 3. 
 212. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 125 (explaining the symbolic costs of habeas, 
despite the fact that states tend to win the vast majority of habeas cases). 
 213. For arguments to modify federal habeas corpus based on changing institutional needs, 
see KING & HOFFMAN, supra note 158, at 167‒71; SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 159, at 
124‒27. 
 214. This article does not argue that federal law should formally incorporate state victims’ 
rights law on this matter, or that federal courts should be bound by state law.  Rather, it only 
asserts that federal courts should acknowledge the universal adoption of victims’ rights in all 
states when considering the appropriate scope of victim involvement in habeas cases.  Cf. Wayne 
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be largely, if not wholly, of symbolic value.  However, most proponents of the 
victims’ rights movement would likely support this as a tool to empower a 
traditionally ignored party to criminal proceedings.  Permitting a victim to 
appear in federal habeas proceedings in these ways would acknowledge that 
federal decision makers are not oblivious to the interests and sovereignty of the 
state.215 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Many discussions of rights in the United States proceed on the assumption 
that the Constitution and the branches of government have the lead roles in 
developing rights, often in the face of passive or recalcitrant states.  Still, over 
the years developments of victims’ rights in criminal procedure turns that 
assumption on its head.  For several decades, states have taken the lead in the 
victims’ rights revolution, and the federal government has followed that lead 
by passing legislation that supports victims’ rights.  All of these developments 
raise implications for federalism.  Victims’ rights have received extended and 
continued, if varied, attention in the fifty states.  For that reason, and because it 
would on balance not serve the values of federalism, Congress should not pass 
the VRA.  States can continue to serve as laboratories on victims’ rights, but 
nationalization of those rights through the VRA is unnecessary and 
inappropriate.  Nonetheless, whether or not the VRA is passed, federalism 
concerns argue in favor of federal courts recognizing a robust version of 
victims’ rights when considering habeas corpus petitions from prisoners 
challenging their state court convictions.  The development of victims’ rights 
at the federal and state levels thus does not occur in completely separate 












                                                 
 
A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243 (2010) (discussing the 
application of state law in federal criminal proceedings). 
 215. Cf. Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2236, 2317‒18 (2014) (arguing that federal criminal proceedings will be more legitimate if 
the federal system pays more deference to local practices in criminal justice). 




























MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 
      
Ala. ✓ ✓ Oral or written 
statement 
1 year 15,000 
                                                 
 216. For statues that specifically apply to rules governing victim input and presence at parole 
hearings, see ALA. CODE §§ 15-22-36(3)(i), 15-23-79 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-
4411(H) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1113(a) (2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3043 (West 
2015); COLO. REV. STAT.  § 24-4.1-302.5 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9416 (2014); FLA. 
STAT. § 960.001(e) (2015); FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 16; GA. CODE ANN. § 17-17-13 (2014); 730 
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105/10 (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-40-5-1 to 35-40-13-5 (West 
2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-3 (West 2015); IOWA CODE § 915.18 (2014); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-3717(K)(h) (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.530 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PRO. § 11-403 (West 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B § 3(b), (p) (West 2015); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.771 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-43 (2014); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(6) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-202, 46-24-212 (West 
2015); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:8-k(II)(t) (2015); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:4B-44 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-25(E) (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§12.1-34-02(18) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.12 (West 2015); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 
34(a); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11-201 (West 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-6 (2015); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1560 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-28C-1(10), 24-15-3 (2015); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-103(2) (2014); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §56.02(7) (West 2015); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-4 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5305(c)(1) (2015); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 7.69.032(2)(a) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1) (2014).  See also SUSAN C. 
KINNEVY & JOEL M. CAPLAN, NATIONAL SURVEYS OF STATE PAROLE BOARDS: MODELS OF 
SERVICE DELIVERY (2008); Crime Victims Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2015); IDAHO ADMIN. 
CODE § 50.01.01.300 (2014); Parole/Pardon Board Hearings, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & 
CORR., http://www.doc.la.gov/pages/victim-services/parolepardon-board-hearings/ (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2015); State of Alaska Department of Corrections Policies and Procedures, Chapter: 
Victim’s Right, Subject: Victim Notification, STATE OF ALASKA (2012), http://www.correct.state. 
ak.us/pnp/pdf/1000.01.pdf; Maryland Parole Commission FAQ Index, Victims Rights Related to 
Parole Hearings, DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERV., http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/ 
aboutdpscs/FAQmpc.shtml#answ26 (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Information for Crime Victims, 
STATE OF N.J., STATE PAROLE BD., http://www.state.nj.us/parole/victim.html (last visited Aug. 
17, 2015); Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, https:// 
www.parole.ny.gov/faq.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Attendance at Hearings, OKLA. 
PARDONS & PAROLE BD., http://www.ok.gov/ppb/Parole_Process/Hearing_Process/Hearing_ 
Attendance/index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Victim Information Guide, OR. BD. OF 
PAROLE & POST-PRISON SUPERVISION, http://www.oregon.gov/BOPPPS/pages/victims_guide. 
aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); Victims Services, VA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://vadoc.virginia. 
gov/victim/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2015); What You Need to Know About Open Parole Bd. 
Hearings, W.V. PAROLE BD., http://www.paroleboard.wv.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/ 
Victim%27s%20Rights.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); Victim Input, WYO. BD. OF PAROLE, 
http://boardofparole.wy.gov/victimservices/victimappearances.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2015). 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 
Alaska ✓ ✓ Written 
statement 




Ariz. ✓ ✓ Oral or written 
statement 
2 years 25,000 
Ark. - - Can meet with 
the parole 
board prior to 





1 year 10,000; 25,000 
for catastrophic 
injuries 








3 years 63,000 
Colo. ✓ - Written 
statement 
1 year 20,000 (each 
district may set 
a lower 
minimum) 
Conn. ✓ ✓ Oral or written 
statement 
2 years 15,000; 20,000 
in cases of 
homicide 
Del. - ✓ Oral or written 
statement 
1 year 25,000; 50,000 
when injuries 
are total and 
permanent. 
Fla. ✓ ✓ Oral or written 
statement 
1 year 15,000; 30,000 
for catastrophic 
injuries 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 
Ga. - - Written 
statement 
1 year 25,000 





if only medical 
expenses 
claimed 
Idaho ✓ ✓ Written or oral 
statement 
1 year 25,000 




2 years 27,000 





180 days 15,000 




2 years No overall limit; 
maximum for 
each expense 
Kan. ✓ - Can speak to 
the parole 





a month in one 
of three cities; 
written 
statement; via 
telephone for a 
verbal 
comment 
2 years 25,000 
Ky. - ✓ Written 
statement 
5 years 25,000 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 
La. ✓ - 217 Via telephone 
from the office 
of the local 
district 
attorney, prior 
to the hearing 
1 year 10,000; 25,000 
when injuries 
are total and 
permanent 




3 years 15,000 
Md. ✓ Only in the 





meet with the 
parole 
commissioner 
prior to the 
hearing 
3 years 45,000 






3 years 25,000 
Mich. ✓ - Written or oral 
statement (in 
person or over 
the telephone) 
given to a 
member of the 
board prior to 
the hearing 
1 year 25,000 




3 years 50,000 
                                                 
 217. Louisiana does not have a physical parole board hearing.  In other words, even the 
offender does not meet in-person with the board—all communication is done via teleconference.  
The board members are at the headquarters in Baton Rouge while the offender testifies on the 
phone from the closest state prison or parish facility.  Victims can testify, but they must go to 
either Baton Rouge, where the parole Board is meeting, or to the institution where the offender 
will testify.  Parole/Pardon Board Hearings, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., http://www. 
doc.la.gov/pages/victim-services/parolepardon-board-hearings/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 
Miss. ✓ - Written or 
recorded 
statement 
3 years 20,000 












meeting with a 
board member 
prior to the 
hearing 
2 years 25,000 
Mont. ✓ ✓ Written 
statement 
1 year 25,000 
Neb. ✓ ✓ Written or oral 
statement 
2 years 10,000 





of the board 
prior to the 
hearing 
1 year 35,000 
N.H. - ✓ Written or oral 
statement 
1 year 25,000 






















✓ - May present an 




Officer of the 
Board prior to 
the hearing 
3 years 25,000; 60,000 
for catastrophic 
injuries 
N.M. ✓ ✓ Written or oral 
statement 
2 years 20,000; 60,000 
for catastrophic 
injuries 




of audiotape or 
videotape to 
the parole 
board prior to 
the hearing 
1 year No medical 
maximum; 
limits on other 
expenses 
N.C. ✓ ✓ Written 
statement218 




                                                 
218. Victims of violent or assaultive crimes whose offenders are in medium or 
minimum custody have the opportunity to appear before the Commission in Raleigh to 
present information they feel is important for the Parole Commissioners to hear.  The 
meetings are held once a week, are 30 minutes each and are limited to five persons per 
scheduled appointment.  There is a limited number of appointments available and they 
are scheduled on a first-come first-serve basis. 
Victim Information, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.gov/Index2.cfm?a= 
000003,002210,002214 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 









appear to give 
an oral 
statement 
1 year 25,000 











prior to the 
hearing 
No limit 50,000 














6 months 47,000 




2 years 46,500 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 
R.I. ✓ - Meeting prior 
to the hearing 
with the board, 
or written 
statement 
3 years 25,000 






180 days 15,000; 25,000 
in catastrophic 
cases 
S.D. - ✓ Written or oral 
statement 
1 year 15,000 
Tenn. ✓ ✓ Written or oral 
statement 
1 year 30,000 
Tex. ✓ _ Oral statement 
presented to 
the board prior 
to the hearing; 
written 
statement 




Utah ✓ ✓ Written or oral 
statement 
No limit 25,000; 
additional 
25,000 medical 
is base amount 
exceeded 
Vt. - ✓ Written or oral 
statement; 
audio or visual 
recording 
No limit 10,000 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 




board in person 
or via 
teleconference 
prior to the 
hearing 
1 year 25,000 











2 years 50,000 
D.C.220 - ✓221 Written or oral 
statement; 
statement via 
audio or video 
during the 
hearing 
1 year 25,000 
                                                 
 219. Washington state has an Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB), which only 
reviews two types of cases; in all other instances there is no parole.  Indeterminate Sentence 
Review Board, DEP’T OF CORR. WASH. STATE, http://www.doc.wa.gov/isrb/ (last visited Sept. 15, 
2015). 
 220. Washington D.C. does not have a sovereign constitution, but still provides for victims’ 
rights under its statutes.  D.C. CODE § 23-1901 (2015). 
 221. In 1997, the District of Columbia Board of Parole was abolished resulting in the transfer 
of authority for parole matters to the U.S. Parole Commission.  Id. at § 14-131. 


















MAX LIMIT  
(IN USD) 
W. Va. - ✓ Oral statement; 
written 
statement; or a 
meeting with a 
parole board 
member prior 
to the hearing 





Wis. ✓ ✓ Written 
statement or 
oral statement 
1 year 40,000; 
additional 2,000 
for funerals 
Wyo. - - Prior to the 
hearing victims 







through a DVD 
or audio 
recording 
1 year 15,000; 25,000 
for catastrophic 
cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
